




Power and democracy in Iceland: An  
introduction
Guðmundur Heiðar Frímannsson, Professor of philosophy, School of 
Humanities and Social Science, University of Akureyri
Democracy is a complex subject and power is no simpler. In the research project Power 
and democracy these two constitutive facts of  Icelandic society are investigated from vari­
ous points of  view. This research project which results are presented in this special is­
sue of  Icelandic Review of  Politics and Administration has been going on since 2014. It has 
resulted in various theoretical articles published earlier. This special issue is not a final 
report of  an investigation into power and democracy in Iceland as has been published 
in other Nordic countries. The funds received for this project were more limited than 
political scientists received in other Nordic countries to conduct similar investigations 
of  their own governing structures. The results are varied and do not form a coherent 
whole but they are interesting in their own right. This special issue marks the ultimate 
point in the research project. 
All the articles engage with various features of  Icelandic democracy, be it the ma­
chinery of  state, Icelandic power structure, political parties or the changing social back­
ground of  the citizens and their relations to the Icelandic state. All except one are em­
pirical investigations of  Icelandic democracy. Árnason´s paper is about the normative 
features of  Icelandic democracy interweaving philosophical explorations with empirical 
facts and interpretations of  probably the most important political event in recent Ice­
landic history. As most of  the papers in this volume Árnason´s takes notice of  the finan­
cial collapse in Iceland in 2008. An obvious question is: Why is this event important for 
theoretical investigations into Icelandic government and politics, power and democracy 
in Iceland now ten years after the collapse? It is difficult to explain for outsiders why 
the financial collapse is so penetrating for Icelanders and why it is still politically potent. 
The first thing to notice is that the collapse is not a single event but a fairly long series of  
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events that have no single meaning. There had been continuous growth of  the Icelandic 
economy for many years and the government at the time had argued that international 
finance was the new way for Icelanders to prosper. The president had delivered speech 
after speech saying that Icelanders had discovered a new method for making money, the 
Viking method. The financial system grew at enormous speed impacting most other 
spheres of  life in the country, spreading money wherever the new financial wizards 
went, into culture, academia, the media. Then, suddenly, one October day, the sixth to 
be precise, the growth disappeared and the whole financial system collapsed. The three 
largest banks went bust in one week along with other smaller financial institutions. In 
the afternoon of  the sixth of  October, the prime minister gave a speech telling the na­
tion that there was a danger of  national bankruptcy if  the Icelandic state guaranteed the 
loss of  the banks indicating that the nation´s independence and sovereignty might be in 
danger because the banks owed such enormous sums to financial institutions in other 
countries.1 He ended his speech like an American president saying: God bless Iceland. 
What had really happened? The three largest banks had grown so enormously that 
their combined wealth amounted to ten GNPs. There was no possibility for the Ice­
landic state to back all the three largest banks. The hope was that one of  them might be 
saved, Kaupthing, but that turned out to be impossible. I do not intend to go into any 
details in this story because it is not necessary in this context. But the important thing 
to notice is that suddenly Icelandic citizens felt they saw with their own eyes their rep­
resentatives in government and parliament as blundering idiots, morally corrupt, ready 
to act on behalf  of  special interests but having neglected the common good in the years 
leading up to the collapse. It was not a pretty sight and the citizens were shocked. They 
still are as some of  the contributions to this volume demonstrate. Admittedly, this is 
an impression not backed by social research but something of  this sort must have hap­
pened if  we are to make sense of  the political fallout of  the financial collapse in Iceland. 
It must also be kept in mind that Icelandic politicians managed the economy, including 
the saving of  the banking system in 2008­2009, well enough to secure a strong and 
steady growth so that now the Icelandic economy is in better shape than in the years 
leading up to the collapse in 2008.
A background fact to these events is that Icelandic politics in the twentieth century, 
ever since the 1930s was a very special practice meaning that parliament and the political 
parties controlled much of  public society in Iceland. They controlled the public radio 
and later television, while private radio and television was banned, through a politi­
cally appointed board controlling both the hiring of  staff  and programs, banking was 
controlled through politically appointed boards with members of  parliament being in 
charge of  public banks often using this position for political purposes. Ministers of  
government could appoint specialists to their ministry without any restraint of  law and 
the same applied to appointments to the courts, the minister of  education appointed all 
academic staff  to the University of  Iceland until 1989, and it was only in the final decade 
or so that evaluation committees put any pressure on the minister. This is not said to 
point a finger at any political party but only to describe a part of  the political system in 
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Iceland that all political parties accepted. All of  this may be common facts for Icelanders 
but for those not knowing much about Icelandic political culture these facts can make 
clearer some of  the weaknesses of  the public political system some of  which are still 
in place and being fought about. Hopefully, this might enable them to appreciate how 
skewed and special political culture was in the decades leading up to the 1990s when 
Iceland entered the European Economic Area. Then it had to start adapting to modern 
conventions in democratic practices and one of  the first things Icelandic politicians had 
to do was to let go of  the banks. They were sold to private individuals and we know 
now that that this was not done in a proper manner. One of  the buyers got away with 
lies and manipulations, none of  them had to pay out of  their own pocket for the banks 
but they lent each other money to pay for their shares. This meant that there was a risk 
built into the system as a whole, the fate of  the three major banks was closely linked 
but the state did not put any pressure on the buyers to certify that they were using their 
own money, those governing the state did not know how the financiers were financing 
their buying of  the banks. The basic idea seems to have been laissez faire on behalf  of  
the state believing there was no need to control or regulate the banking system strictly. 
Similar developments in this field occurred in other European countries at the time but 
not in the other Nordic countries. There the state followed closely what happened in 
the banks and most of  them survived. In Iceland there was no tradition of  controlling 
a large banking sector. Some of  the buyers turned out to be bent and incompetent and 
some of  them ended in jail in the years after the collapse in 2008. All of  them lost a lot 
of  money and the political culture lost its innocence after being clientelistic and corrupt 
for decades. The citizens enjoyed this system, supported the politicians promoting the 
growth of  the banks as long as “their” politicians were in power. This is a well­known 
pattern in research on political corruption. Most of  the citizens have not recovered but 
some of  them have not yet fathomed what really happened.
Árnason uses three models of  democracy, liberal, republican and deliberative, to 
interpret and understand the course of  events leading up to the financial collapse and 
the years after. It turns out that all of  the theories are needed to understand the ideas 
driving the political agents. He also looks further back to understand the present Icelandic 
political culture, even to the nineteenth century and the politics of  independence 
practised at that time.
Vilhelmsdóttir and Kristinsson ask the question what the relationship is between 
economic growth and trust in government. Usually, the relation is that the better the 
economic growth the more trust. It should come as no surprise that trust in politicians 
and bankers plummeted in 2008 and 2009. The same applies to trust in some of  the 
political institutions. The interesting thing is that Iceland has recovered economically 
fairly quickly after the collapse, but trust has not followed the economic recovery. This 
is intriguing but maybe it should come as no surprise. It must be said that the political 
culture has not changed, its superficiality is still there, it is still “characterized by partisan 
bickering” as Árnason expresses it. There is still the tendency to speak with two tongues, 
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some of  the things you say in opposition contradict what you say when in government 
the politicians just shrug their shoulders seemingly saying this is how we do things. The 
problem is that behaving like this is an insult to the rationality of  the citizens. And it is 
demeaning for the political culture and those who care for it. Vilhelmsdóttir and Kristin­
sson find that for those groups hardest hit by the financial collapse “the crisis may have 
been a critical experience creating a sense of  alienation towards the political forces.” 
Another cause preventing the rise of  trust in the political system is the political volatility 
after the financial crash. Even though trust is one of  the most basic things in human 
affairs it is one of  the most difficult to understand.
There are various structures that shape democracy and power in the Icelandic sys­
tem of  government. One of  them is local authorities, the lower level of  the two­tiered 
government in Iceland. Local government has a long history in Iceland, it has been with 
us for a thousand years at least. In 930 Icelanders established a state or at least a general 
government for the whole country. It seems that “hreppar,” the old units of  local gov­
ernment, came into being a little later and from the beginning they were responsible for 
the welfare of  people living in their area. These old units have now been transformed 
into new local authorities but many of  them still survive. In the old units it was assumed 
that local government was sovereign in the sense that the leader could decide what to do 
and how the local authority executed its obligations. This old tradition lives on in the fact 
that Icelandic politicians in parliament have never been willing to use the power of  the 
state to determine the size and territory of  each local authority. In recent decades there 
has been constant pressure on local authorities in Iceland to take on more functions 
from central government. Because there has been no political will to use the authority of  
parliament to enlarge the territory of  each local government what has happened is that 
the central government has pushed various functions on to the local level and left the 
representatives there to deal with it. This has certainly created pressure within the local 
authorities to amalgamate with others creating larger units developing more professional 
bureaucracies enabling them to handle more complex functions. Sometimes the local 
authorities have decided to cooperate rather than to amalgamate. However, they will 
develop in the near future they will grow bigger to be able to service the needs of  the 
citizens and they will also become more professional and, hopefully, restrain the power 
of  the local councillors.
Another structure that shapes Icelandic politics is corporatism, the involvement of  
agents outside government that represent some relevant interest. This is a feature of  the 
exercise of  power of  central government in all the Scandinavian countries and it applies 
to Iceland as well. Indeed, I think we should expect corporatism in political systems that 
are consensual. The reason is that corporatism is one way of  involving those who are 
representing powerful organised groups in such societies in public decisions with the 
foreseeable consequence that the decisions taken are in line with the will and wishes of  
these powerful groups avoiding conflict and disunity in society. Corporatism is a part of  
the policy process and it can both involve the formulation of  policy before a decision 
is taken and it can be a part of  the implementation process. The problematic aspect of  
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corporatism is that it is only those organisations powerful enough that are offered a seat 
at the political policy table but not the ordinary citizens themselves. If  the policy process 
is about discovering the common good, then it seems more reasonable to expect the 
citizens to be able to discover the common good rather than those who represent large 
groups or organisations. Alternatively, the bureaucrats should be equipped with the skills 
to divine the common good independently of  any organised interest in society.
It is somewhat surprising that Iceland has developed differently from the other Nor­
dic countries but in Óskarsdóttir´s investigation of  Icelandic corporatism it turns out 
that other Nordic countries have limited the number of  public committees including 
members representing organized interests while they have increased in number in Ice­
land. She investigates the time from 1970 until 2017. This means that corporatism in 
Iceland is still strong while it has weakened in the other Nordic countries. This is a 
significant new fact about Icelandic government. It is not quite clear why this is so, but 
one suggestion might be that in Iceland the executive branch of  government has tradi­
tionally been weaker than in other Nordic countries and it might not be able to handle 
the role of  formulating policy and implementing it properly without the support of  
organized interests in society.
Another structural feature of  Icelandic government is ministerial government. Min­
isterial government is government by ministers who are independent of  each other and 
do not take collective responsibility for each other´s decisions. Their actions and deci­
sions are not subject to approval of  the government as a whole and even though it is 
supposed to function as an arena for discussion then this limited restraint does not really 
happen because the bills are only introduced at meetings without giving other ministers 
time to read. The major problem for this kind of  government is the temptation for each 
minister to propose bills that ministers of  coalition parties are unable to accept. This 
temptation might be a force sufficiently strong to break up governments at any moment 
in its life. But there have been other forces at work preventing this temptation to take 
hold of  headstrong ministers. Indriðason and Kristinsson´s examination of  this issue 
draws out that before the 2008 financial collapse Alþingi played an unusually active role 
in processing government bills, short ideological distance between the coalition par­
ties helped and strong cohesion of  each coalition party contributed to commitment to 
the government. Then they add: “Part of  making this system work involved allowing 
lobbyists of  various kinds relatively unfettered access to Alþingi so that interests as­
sociated with the different coalition partners could have a say in how government bills 
developed.”
After the financial collapse, this has changed because some effective mechanism 
supporting collective government are in place, things like long coalition agreements and 
increased attention to hierarchy. But Alþingi is still a major place for lobbyism. It is 
interesting to note that lobbyists get the access they want to Alþingi, meaning that they 
can support the initiatives of  their parties and ministers without any regulation. This 
points to the close connection between organized interests and the parties in parliament 
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organized interests in government. This indicates the strong and active role of  organiza­
tions, businesses and other organized interests in shaping public policy in Iceland. The 
worrying thing is that this seems to be unregulated.
The major actors on the political scene are the political parties. They serve the vi­
tal function of  giving the citizens a formulation of  a set of  political views that they 
can identify with. A modern representative democracy would be ungovernable without 
political parties. If  we assumed that all the representatives in Alþingi were elected as 
individuals but not as parts of  groups, they would have to negotiate all issues between 
the 63 members rather than as parties coming to an agreement that supported a govern­
ment relying on the consent of  the members of  the coalition parties. It is conceivable 
that the 63 might form a government, but it is unlikely. One possible result might be 
that all government would be bureaucratic in the sense that the executive branch would 
become independent of  the legislative branch because Alþingi could not function as 
a policy decision chamber for the executive branch. It would take far too much time 
to come to agreement about even the smallest things. Fortunately, this is not likely to 
happen, political parties are still alive and well and serve the interests of  citizens even 
though they are not perfect vehicles of  the common good. Önnudóttir and Harðarson 
investigate the long­term changes in two cleavages of  Icelandic political life, the urban/
country cleavage and the left/right cleavage. They look at 33 years of  voting behaviour 
to see if  there are any changes in these two cleavages and also if  there are changes in 
party identification and its influence on voting.
They find that there are not substantial changes in the cleavages, they are still relevant 
for citizens today as they were 33 years ago. Political parties must take notice of  them in 
their decisions and their policy formation in so far as Icelandic political parties formu­
late policies they take seriously and pursue in their political work. But party identification 
has changed during the time this research spans, it has weakened, and political parties 
cannot depend on their supporters´ loyalty as they could before. It also seems to be true 
that socio­economic status does not influence the citizens´ decisions in voting as it did 
earlier on. These results are important, and they make life more complicated for the 
political parties, they must stretch themselves to reach new voters but at the same time 
satisfy their core supporters.
One of  the things that has changed in the last decades is that the citizens have be­
come more diverse. Immigration to Iceland has increased since the turn of  the century 
and now they constitute about 10% of  the population. This is a major change from a 
uniform society of  white descendants of  immigrants to Iceland about 1100 years ago, 
to a society of  people from various places of  the world with backgrounds that influ­
ence their attitudes, desires and behaviour making them different from the local popula­
tion. This development was well on the way before the financial collapse in 2008 and 
in the aftermath of  it many immigrants lost their jobs. Most Icelanders had welcomed 
the newcomers before 2008 and the problems in the labour market after 2008 did not 
change that, and still the most widespread attitude is to welcome the immigrants. This 
is not to say that they do not have problems, they certainly do and there are prejudices. 
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But on the whole, they are welcomed and there does not seem to be any fertile ground in 
Iceland for the populism prominent in a number of  European countries at the moment.
Einarsdóttir, Heijstra and Rafnsdóttir investigate the integration of  immigrants into 
Icelandic society asking how successful we are at making immigrants citizens of  Iceland. 
The answer is that this process is relatively successful but there are things that need 
improving. They concentrate on three groups of  immigrants: Lithuanians, Poles and 
Filipinos. The first two groups can move to Iceland without any problems because of  
the European Economic Area guaranteeing freedom of  movement for people among 
other things. But Filipinos must get permission from the authorities to stay in Iceland. It 
is interesting to see that the Filipinos adapt better than the other two groups to Icelandic 
society. It is imperative to integrate the immigrants into the political process so that they 
enjoy their citizenship to the full.
The citizens of  any democracy have to have a media that they can trust, a media 
that takes truth seriously and attempts to serve the interests of  the citizens, informing 
them of  the relevant and important facts in the democratic system they are living in. 
There must be certain things in place for the citizens to trust the media, the media´s 
owners must be reliable and not ready to limit the freedom of  the journalists when it 
serves their interests. This does not only apply to privately owned media but also to the 
public media. Even though the state­owned media in Iceland enjoys the trust of  many 
more citizens than the privately owned it can be subject to interferences by the political 
authorities. This happened regularly in the past, but times have admittedly changed and 
now the public media has been more independent than before, hence possibly, its higher 
trust.
Jóhannsdóttir and Ólafsson investigate the struggle of  the Icelandic media because 
of  technological developments, web­based media are competing with traditional news­
papers and it seems that in the not too distant future there will not be any newspapers 
in Iceland, i.e. printed media. There is fiercer international competition for the money 
from advertising, especially from Google and Facebook. It is not only that the media 
must serve the interests of  the citizens, but it is also important for a small nation like the 
Icelandic one speaking its own language. Media serves the public discourse in Icelandic 
of  Icelandic citizens. In all probability the media will be supported by the state fairly 
soon to secure a vital element in public culture.
Power is not something you see or hear but one can discern it from various indica­
tions in society. Buildings can indicate power, institutions can embody power and so can 
individuals. Groups are probably most often vehicles of  power, sometimes the groups 
are formal like the group of  judges at a court or parliamentarians in parliament. Democ­
racy in its present guise does not exclude power but puts a limit on its exercise because 
human rights are now a well­established part of  modern democracy. But it is certainly 
possible to define democracy as majority rule and nothing more. In that case the major­
ity can do anything it wants, i.e. the power of  the majority is unlimited. But defining de­
mocracy in that way is not practised anywhere even though the majority has vast powers 
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function if  it only consisted of  majority rule. The citizens must be free equals for de­
mocracy to be a benefit for them. They must be able to express their opinions without 
fear and without putting their lives in danger and the democratic system must be based 
on the notion of  one citizen one vote or some other equivalent interpretation of  equal­
ity. Democracy in this sense is compatible with power because democracy is not anarchy.
Kristinsson in a path breaking research investigates power in Icelandic society. Power 
is expressed in elite groups and their resources as it is conceived in this research. It is 
not an investigation into the exercise of  power but in how power is structured in elite 
groups in Icelandic society. The elitism seems to have developed from traditional elit­
ism based on kinship ties and social exclusion in the early twentieth century, through 
competitive elitism to professional pluralism in the early twenty first century. This elite 
system excluded women at first and is still skewed against women, meaning that women 
have not achieved the same status as men in the elite system although gender differences 
are decreasing. The elite system has also become more meritocratic as professionalism 
increased and the system has become more open. Education is one of  the criteria for 
inclusion in the elite as it is a necessary feature of  professionalism and it is closely related 
to social and economic status.
Þórhallsson investigates the shelter theory explaining the need of  small states to 
have a larger state as its protector. His paper is the only one dealing with Iceland´s 
relations with other states. Small states need active involvement with other states both 
commercially, industrially and politically. They have no way of  resisting the force, 
financial or military, of  larger states. Their only hope to stay independent and sovereign 
is to negotiate a protective contract with a larger state, a state that is willing to assist its 
smaller neighbour or protectorate when the going gets rough in the international waters 
for the small state. States are not benevolent actors taking on responsibility out of  the 
goodness of  their hearts but are selfish or governed by their own interest in whatever 
they do. When they take on a responsibility for another state, albeit a smaller one, they 
must get something in return. One thing they automatically get is increased influence in 
their sphere of  control, their area of  influence might become bigger and they might be 
able to influence the course of  events farther afield than before. Or they might ask for 
access, military or otherwise, to the protectorate. Taking a small state under its wings 
might also be a matter of  prestige. Whatever it is, the large states gets in return it is 
something of  value to it.
As should be clear from Þórhallsson´s article the event in 2006 when the last air 
force jets left Iceland against the will of  the Icelandic government was significant in the 
history of  the relation between Iceland and the United States. The judgement of  the US 
government was that these jets were needed in other parts of  the world and served the 
interests of  the US better by being stationed there. At the time the Northern Atlantic 
was peaceful, and no obvious threat seemed to be able to endanger Iceland´s security. 
In the twelve years that have passed, Icelandic governments have managed to negoti­
ate agreements with various states about Icelandic air defence and safety in the waters 
around Iceland. At the same time, they have said that the defence agreement with the 
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US is the most important pillar of  Icelandic defence arrangements. All this is consistent 
with the shelter theory. Meaning that in actual fact a tiny state like Iceland must make 
arrangements for its own defence in collaboration with friendly states, but keeping up 
the appearances that the US is still the most valuable partner for Icelandic defence on 
land, sea and in the air. The jury seems still to be out if  the time of  the Pax Americana in 
the North Atlantic is over or has a future. If  it is over Iceland will need another shelter.
Are there any general results about Icelandic government that we see in these inves­
tigations? There are some that we can mention at the end. The first is that the political 
system is going through a volatile period making governing more difficult that it was 
for a long time in Iceland. Trust is low in politicians and political institutions and party 
loyalty is weaker than it used to be. Second, Icelandic government needs the back up 
of  large organisations to govern successfully. The obvious reason for corporatism to be 
as widespread as it is, is probably that the government is not strong enough. We might 
even expect an increase in corporatism because of  the difficulties in governing. Third, 
we seem to be doing something right about immigrants even though there is room 
for improvement. Fourth, political life has become more problematic for the citizens 
because the political institutions cannot not always be trusted and the media is much 
weaker than before and tends to serve private interests, often neglecting its public role 
as a resource for the citizens of  reliable information. Fifth, the power structure seems to 
developing into more professionalism, away from nepotism and corruption. Lastly, the 
local government might be developing into bigger units but it will go slowly.
I hope the readers of  this volume enjoy the articles as much as I have done in editing 
them. They are a major contribution to political research in Iceland.
Note
1 See https://www.stjornarradid.is/efst­a­baugi/frettir/stok­frett/2008/10/06/Avarp­forsaetisrad­
herra­vegna­serstakra­adstaedna­a­fjarmalamarkadi/

